The Board of Trustees of Nationwide Mutual Funds and Nationwide Variable Insurance Trust (the “Funds”) has approved the continued delegation of the authority to vote proxies relating to the securities held in the portfolios of the Funds to each Fund’s investment adviser or subadviser, some of which advisers and subadvisers use an independent service provider, as described below.

Nationwide Fund Advisors (“NFA” or the “Adviser”), is an investment adviser that is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”). NFA currently provides investment advisory services to registered investment companies (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Clients”).

Voting proxies that are received in connection with underlying portfolio securities held by Clients is an important element of the portfolio management services that NFA performs for Clients. NFA’s goal in performing this service is to make proxy voting decisions: (i) to vote or not to vote proxies in a manner that serves the best economic interests of Clients; and (ii) that avoid the influence of conflicts of interest. To implement this goal, NFA has adopted proxy voting guidelines (the “Proxy Voting Guidelines”) to assist it in making proxy voting decisions and in developing procedures for effecting those decisions. The Proxy Voting Guidelines are designed to ensure that, where NFA has the authority to vote proxies, all legal, fiduciary, and contractual obligations will be met.

The Proxy Voting Guidelines address a wide variety of individual topics, including, among other matters, shareholder voting rights, anti-takeover defenses, board structures and the election of directors, executive and director compensation, reorganizations, mergers, and various shareholder proposals.

The proxy voting records of the Funds are available to shareholders on the Trust’s website, www.nationwidefunds.com, and the SEC’s website.

HOW PROXIES ARE VOTED

NFA has delegated to Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), an independent service provider, the administration of proxy voting for Client portfolio securities directly managed by NFA, subject to oversight by NFA’s “Proxy Voting Committee.” ISS, a Delaware corporation, provides proxy-voting services to many asset managers on a global basis. The NFA Proxy Voting Committee has reviewed, and will continue to review annually, the relationship with ISS and the quality and effectiveness of the various services provided by ISS.

Specifically, ISS assists NFA in the proxy voting and corporate governance oversight process by developing and updating the “ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines,” which are incorporated into the Proxy Voting Guidelines, and by providing research and analysis, recommendations regarding votes, operational implementation, and recordkeeping and reporting services. NFA’s decision to retain ISS is based principally on the view that the services that ISS provides, subject to oversight by NFA, generally will result in proxy voting decisions which serve the best economic interests of Clients. NFA has reviewed, analyzed, and determined that the ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines are consistent with the views of NFA on the various types of proxy proposals. When the ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines do not cover a specific proxy issue and ISS does not provide a recommendation: (i) ISS will notify NFA; and (ii) NFA will use its best judgment in voting proxies on behalf of the Clients. A summary of the ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines is set forth below.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

NFA does not engage in investment banking, administration or management of corporate retirement plans, or any other activity that is likely to create a potential conflict of interest. In addition, because Client proxies are voted by ISS pursuant to the pre-determined ISS Proxy Voting Guidelines, NFA generally does not make an actual determination of how to vote a particular proxy, and, therefore, proxies voted on behalf of Clients do not reflect any conflict of interest. Nevertheless, the Proxy Voting Guidelines address the possibility of such a conflict of interest arising.
The Proxy Voting Guidelines provide that, if a proxy proposal were to create a conflict of interest between the interests of a Client and those of NFA (or between a Client and those of any of NFA’s affiliates, including Nationwide Fund Distributors LLC and Nationwide), then the proxy should be voted strictly in conformity with the recommendation of ISS. To monitor compliance with this policy, any proposed or actual deviation from a recommendation of ISS must be reported by the NFA Proxy Voting Committee to the chief counsel for NFA. The chief counsel for NFA then will provide guidance concerning the proposed deviation and whether a deviation presents any potential conflict of interest. If NFA then casts a proxy vote that deviates from an ISS recommendation, the affected Client (or other appropriate Client authority) will be given a report of this deviation.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH PROXIES WILL NOT BE VOTED

NFA, through ISS, shall attempt to process every vote for all domestic and foreign proxies that they receive; however, there may be cases in which NFA will not process a proxy because it is impractical or too expensive to do so. For example, NFA will not process a proxy in connection with a foreign security if the cost of voting a foreign proxy outweighs the benefit of voting the foreign proxy, when NFA has not been given enough time to process the vote, or when a sell order for the foreign security is outstanding and proxy voting would impede the sale of the foreign security. Also, NFA generally will not seek to recall the securities on loan for the purpose of voting the securities unless it is in the best interests of the applicable Fund to do so.

DELEGATION OF PROXY VOTING TO SUBADVISERS TO FUNDS

For any Fund, or portion of a Fund that is directly managed by a subadviser, the Trustees of the Fund and NFA have delegated proxy voting authority to that sub-adviser. Each subadviser has provided its proxy voting policies to NFA for review and these proxy voting policies are described below. Each subadviser is required to represent quarterly to NFA that (1) all proxies of the Fund(s) advised by the sub-adviser were voted in accordance with the subadviser’s proxy voting policies as provided to NFA and (2) there have been no material changes to the subadviser’s proxy voting policies.

ISS’ 2018 U.S. Proxy Voting Concise Guidelines

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections

General Recommendation: Generally vote for director nominees, except under the following circumstances:

Independence

Vote against or withhold from non-independent directors (Executive Directors and Non-Independent Non-Executive Directors per ISS’ Categorization of Directors) when:

- Independent directors comprise 50 percent or less of the board;
- The non-independent director serves on the audit, compensation, or nominating committee;
- The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee; or
- The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee.

Composition

Attendance at Board and Committee Meetings: Generally vote against or withhold from directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) who attend less than 75 percent of the aggregate of their board and committee meetings for the period for which they served, unless an acceptable reason for absences is disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. Acceptable reasons for director absences are generally limited to the following:

- Medical issues/illness;
- Family emergencies; and
- Missing only one meeting (when the total of all meetings is three or fewer).
If the proxy disclosure is unclear and insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of the aggregate of his/her board and committee meetings during his/her period of service, vote against or withhold from the director(s) in question.

**Overboarded Directors:** Generally vote against or withhold from individual directors who:

- Sit on more than five public company boards; or
- Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own— withhold only at their outside boards.

**Diversity:** Highlight boards with no gender diversity. However, no adverse vote recommendations will be made due to any lack of gender diversity.

**Responsiveness**

Vote case-by-case on individual directors, committee members, or the entire board of directors as appropriate if:

- The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of the shares cast in the previous year. Factors that will be considered are:
  - Disclosed outreach efforts by the board to shareholders in the wake of the vote;
  - Rationale provided in the proxy statement for the level of implementation;
  - The subject matter of the proposal;
  - The level of support for and opposition to the resolution in past meetings;
  - Actions taken by the board in response to the majority vote and its engagement with shareholders;
  - The continuation of the underlying issue as a voting item on the ballot (as either shareholder or management proposals); and
  - Other factors as appropriate.
- The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of shares are tendered;
- At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.

Vote case-by-case on Compensation Committee members (or, in exceptional cases, the full board) and the Say on Pay proposal if:

- The company’s previous say-on-pay received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast. Factors that will be considered are:
  - The company’s response, including:
    - Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);
    - Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;
    - Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;
  - Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
  - Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
  - The company’s ownership structure; and
  - Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.
- The board implements an advisory vote on executive compensation on a less frequent basis than the frequency that received the plurality of votes cast.

**Accountability**

Vote against or withhold from the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) for the following:

**Problematic Takeover Defenses/Governance Structure**

**Poison Pills:** Vote against or withhold from all nominees (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if:
• The company has a poison pill that was not approved by shareholders\(^5\). However, vote case-by-case on nominees if the board adopts an initial pill with a term of one year or less, depending on the disclosed rationale for the adoption, and other factors as relevant (such as a commitment to put any renewal to a shareholder vote).
• The board makes a material adverse modification to an existing pill, including, but not limited to, extension, renewal, or lowering the trigger, without shareholder approval.

**Classified Board Structure:** The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election. All appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable.

**Removal of Shareholder Discretion on Classified Boards:** The company has opted into, or failed to opt out of, state laws requiring a classified board structure.

**Director Performance Evaluation:** The board lacks mechanisms to promote accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one- and three-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s five-year total shareholder return and operational metrics. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:
• A classified board structure;
• A supermajority vote requirement;
• Either a plurality vote standard in uncontested director elections, or a majority vote standard in contested elections;
• The inability of shareholders to call special meetings;
• The inability of shareholders to act by written consent;
• A multi-class capital structure; and/or
• A non-shareholder-approved poison pill.

**Unilateral Bylaw/Charter Amendments and Problematic Capital Structures:** Generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the board amends the company’s bylaws or charter without shareholder approval in a manner that materially diminishes shareholders’ rights or that could adversely impact shareholders, considering the following factors:
• The board’s rationale for adopting the bylaw/charter amendment without shareholder ratification;
• Disclosure by the company of any significant engagement with shareholders regarding the amendment;
• The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights caused by the board’s unilateral amendment to the bylaws/charter;
• The board’s track record with regard to unilateral board action on bylaw/charter amendments or other entrenchment provisions;
• The company’s ownership structure;
• The company’s existing governance provisions;
• The timing of the board’s amendment to the bylaws/charter in connection with a significant business development; and
• Other factors, as deemed appropriate, that may be relevant to determine the impact of the amendment on shareholders.

Unless the adverse amendment is reversed or submitted to a binding shareholder vote, in subsequent years vote case-by-case on director nominees. Generally vote against (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if the directors:
• Classified the board;
• Adopted supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter; or
• Eliminated shareholders’ ability to amend bylaws.

**Problematic Governance Structure - Newly public companies:** For newly public companies, generally vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board (except new nominees, who should be considered case-by-case) if, prior to or in connection with the company’s public offering, the company or its board adopted bylaw or charter provisions materially adverse to shareholder rights, or implemented a multi-class capital structure in which the classes have unequal voting rights considering the following factors:
• The level of impairment of shareholders’ rights;
• The disclosed rationale;
• The ability to change the governance structure (e.g., limitations on shareholders’ right to amend the bylaws or charter, or supermajority vote requirements to amend the bylaws or charter);
• The ability of shareholders to hold directors accountable through annual director elections, or whether the company has a classified board structure;
• Any reasonable sunset provision; and
• Other relevant factors.

Unless the adverse provision and/or problematic capital structure is reversed or removed, vote case-by-case on director nominees in subsequent years.

Restrictions on Shareholders’ Rights

Restricting Binding Shareholder Proposals: Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the governance committee if:

• The company’s governing documents impose undue restrictions on shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws. Such restrictions include, but are not limited to: outright prohibition on the submission of binding shareholder proposals, or share ownership requirements or time holding requirements in excess of SEC Rule 14a-8. Vote against on an ongoing basis.

Problematic Audit-Related Practices

Generally vote against or withhold from the members of the Audit Committee if:

• The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive;
• The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or
• There is persuasive evidence that the Audit Committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.

Vote case-by-case on members of the Audit Committee and potentially the full board if:

• Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence, and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether withhold/against votes are warranted.

Problematic Compensation Practices

In the absence of an Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say on Pay) ballot item or in egregious situations, vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:

• There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
• The company maintains significant problematic pay practices; or
• The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Generally vote against or withhold from the Compensation Committee chair, other committee members, or potentially the full board if:

• The company fails to include a Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions, or under the company’s declared frequency of say on pay; or
• The company fails to include a Frequency of Say on Pay ballot item when required under SEC provisions.

Generally vote against members of the board committee responsible for approving/setting non-employee director compensation if there is a pattern (i.e. two or more years) of awarding excessive non-employee director compensation without disclosing a compelling rationale or other mitigating factors.
Problematic Pledging of Company Stock:

Vote against the members of the committee that oversees risks related to pledging, or the full board, where a significant level of pledged company stock by executives or directors raises concerns. The following factors will be considered:

- The presence of an anti-pledging policy, disclosed in the proxy statement, that prohibits future pledging activity;
- The magnitude of aggregate pledged shares in terms of total common shares outstanding, market value, and trading volume;
- Disclosure of progress or lack thereof in reducing the magnitude of aggregate pledged shares over time;
- Disclosure in the proxy statement that shares subject to stock ownership and holding requirements do not include pledged company stock; and
- Any other relevant factors.

Governance Failures

Under extraordinary circumstances, vote against or withhold from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:

- Material failures of governance, stewardship, risk oversight, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
- Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
- Egregious actions related to a director’s service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.

Voting on Director Nominees in Contested Elections

Vote-No Campaigns

General Recommendation: In cases where companies are targeted in connection with public “vote-no” campaigns, evaluate director nominees under the existing governance policies for voting on director nominees in uncontested elections. Take into consideration the arguments submitted by shareholders and other publicly available information.

Proxy Contests/Proxy Access — Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:

- Long-term financial performance of the company relative to its industry;
- Management’s track record;
- Background to the contested election;
- Nominee qualifications and any compensatory arrangements;
- Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of the critique against management;
- Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates); and
- Stock ownership positions.

In the case of candidates nominated pursuant to proxy access, vote case-by-case considering any applicable factors listed above or additional factors which may be relevant, including those that are specific to the company, to the nominee(s) and/or to the nature of the election (such as whether or not there are more candidates than board seats).

Independent Chair (Separate Chair/CEO)

General Recommendation: Generally vote for shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman’s position be filled by an independent director, taking into consideration the following:

- The scope of the proposal;
- The company’s current board leadership structure;
- The company’s governance structure and practices;
- Company performance; and
- Any other relevant factors that may be applicable.
Regarding the scope of the proposal, consider whether the proposal is precatory or binding and whether the proposal is seeking an immediate change in the chairman role or the policy can be implemented at the next CEO transition.

Under the review of the company’s board leadership structure, ISS may support the proposal under the following scenarios absent a compelling rationale: the presence of an executive or non-independent chair in addition to the CEO; a recent recombination of the role of CEO and chair; and/or departure from a structure with an independent chair. ISS will also consider any recent transitions in board leadership and the effect such transitions may have on independent board leadership as well as the designation of a lead director role.

When considering the governance structure, ISS will consider the overall independence of the board, the independence of key committees, the establishment of governance guidelines, board tenure and its relationship to CEO tenure, and any other factors that may be relevant. Any concerns about a company’s governance structure will weigh in favor of support for the proposal.

The review of the company’s governance practices may include, but is not limited to, poor compensation practices, material failures of governance and risk oversight, related-party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk, corporate or management scandals, and actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impact on shareholders. Any such practices may suggest a need for more independent oversight at the company thus warranting support of the proposal.

ISS’ performance assessment will generally consider one-, three-, and five-year TSR compared to the company’s peers and the market as a whole. While poor performance will weigh in favor of the adoption of an independent chair policy, strong performance over the long term will be considered a mitigating factor when determining whether the proposed leadership change warrants support.

**Proxy Access**

**General Recommendation:** Generally vote for management and shareholder proposals for proxy access with the following provisions:

- **Ownership threshold:** maximum requirement not more than three percent (3%) of the voting power;
- **Ownership duration:** maximum requirement not longer than three (3) years of continuous ownership for each member of the nominating group;
- **Aggregation:** minimal or no limits on the number of shareholders permitted to form a nominating group;
- **Cap:** cap on nominees of generally twenty-five percent (25%) of the board.

Review for reasonableness any other restrictions on the right of proxy access. Generally vote against proposals that are more restrictive than these guidelines.

**CAPITAL/RESTRUCTURING**

**Common Stock Authorization**

**General Recommendation:** Vote for proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.

Vote against proposals at companies with more than one class of common stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights.

Vote against proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares if a vote for a reverse stock split on the same ballot is warranted despite the fact that the authorized shares would not be reduced proportionally.

Vote case-by-case on all other proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issuance. Take into account company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:

- **Past Board Performance:**
  - The company’s use of authorized shares during the last three years;
The Current Request:
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request; and
- The dilutive impact of the request as determined relative to an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company’s need for shares and total shareholder returns.

ISS will apply the relevant allowable increase below to requests to increase common stock that are for general corporate purposes (or to the general corporate purposes portion of a request that also includes a specific need):
- Most companies: 100 percent of existing authorized shares.
- Companies with less than 50 percent of existing authorized shares either outstanding or reserved for issuance: 50 percent of existing authorized shares.
- Companies with one- and three-year total shareholder returns (TSRs) in the bottom 10 percent of the U.S. market as of the end of the calendar quarter that is closest to their most recent fiscal year end: 50 percent of existing authorized shares.
- Companies at which both conditions (B and C) above are both present: 25 percent of existing authorized shares.

If there is an acquisition, private placement, or similar transaction on the ballot (not including equity incentive plans) that ISS is recommending FOR, the allowable increase will be the greater of (i) twice the amount needed to support the transactions on the ballot, and (ii) the allowable increase as calculated above.

Mergers and Acquisitions

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:
- Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction, and strategic rationale.
- Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.
- Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- Negotiations and process - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm’s-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation “wins” can also signify the deal makers’ competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.
- Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the “ISS Transaction Summary” section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.
- Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.

COMPENSATION

**Executive Pay Evaluation**
- Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:
• Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs;
• Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;
• Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed);
• Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;
• Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors is reasonable and does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.

Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation—Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay)

General Recommendation: Vote case-by-case on ballot items related to executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation.

Vote against Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay or “SOP”) if:
• There is a significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
• The company maintains significant problematic pay practices;
• The board exhibits a significant level of poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.

Vote against or withhold from the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:
• There is no SOP on the ballot, and an against vote on an SOP would otherwise be warranted due to pay-for-performance misalignment, problematic pay practices, or the lack of adequate responsiveness on compensation issues raised previously, or a combination thereof;
• The board fails to respond adequately to a previous SOP proposal that received less than 70 percent support of votes cast;
• The company has recently practiced or approved problematic pay practices, including option repricing or option backdating; or
• The situation is egregious.

Primary Evaluation Factors for Executive Pay

Pay-for-Performance Evaluation

ISS annually conducts a pay-for-performance analysis to identify strong or satisfactory alignment between pay and performance over a sustained period. With respect to companies in the Russell 3000 or Russell 3000E Indices, this analysis considers the following:

1. Peer Group Alignment:
   • The degree of alignment between the company’s annualized TSR rank and the CEO’s annualized total pay rank within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
   • The rankings of CEO total pay and company financial performance within a peer group, each measured over a three-year period.
   • The multiple of the CEO’s total pay relative to the peer group median in the most recent fiscal year.
2. Absolute Alignment — the absolute alignment between the trend in CEO pay and company TSR over the prior five fiscal years — i.e., the difference between the trend in annual pay changes and the trend in annualized TSR during the period.
If the above analysis demonstrates significant unsatisfactory long-term pay-for-performance alignment or, in the case of companies outside the Russell indices, misaligned pay and performance are otherwise suggested, our analysis may include any of the following qualitative factors, as relevant to evaluating how various pay elements may work to encourage or to undermine long-term value creation and alignment with shareholder interests:

- The ratio of performance- to time-based equity awards;
- The overall ratio of performance-based compensation;
- The completeness of disclosure and rigor of performance goals;
- The company’s peer group benchmarking practices;
- Actual results of financial/operational metrics, such as growth in revenue, profit, cash flow, etc., both absolute and relative to peers;
- Special circumstances related to, for example, a new CEO in the prior FY or anomalous equity grant practices (e.g., bi-annual awards);
- Realizable pay10 compared to grant pay; and
- Any other factors deemed relevant.

### Problematic Pay Practices

The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:

- Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;
- Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking; and
- Options backdating.

### Problematic Pay Practices related to Non-Performance-Based Compensation Elements

Pay elements that are not directly based on performance are generally evaluated case-by-case considering the context of a company’s overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. Please refer to ISS’ Compensation FAQ document for detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as potentially problematic and may lead to negative recommendations if they are deemed to be inappropriate or unjustified relative to executive pay best practices. The list below highlights the problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:

- Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARS without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);
- Extraordinary perquisites or tax gross-ups, including any gross-up related to a secular trust or restricted stock vesting, or lifetime perquisites;
- New or extended agreements that provide for:
  - Excessive CIC payments (generally exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus);
  - CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties (“single” or “modified single” triggers);
  - CIC payments with excise tax gross-ups (including “modified” gross-ups);
  - Multi-year guaranteed awards that are not at risk due to rigorous performance conditions;
  - Liberal CIC definition combined with any single-trigger CIC benefits;
- Insufficient executive compensation disclosure by externally-managed issuers (EMIs) such that a reasonable assessment of pay programs and practices applicable to the EMI’s executives is not possible;
- Any other provision or practice deemed to be egregious and present a significant risk to investors.

### Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking

- Multi-year guaranteed awards;
- A single or common performance metric used for short- and long-term incentives;
- Lucrative severance packages;
- High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;
- Disproportionate supplemental pensions; or
- Mega equity grants that provide overly large upside opportunity.
Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions, robust stock ownership/holding guidelines, and limitations on accelerated vesting triggers.

**Options Backdating**

The following factors should be examined case-by-case to allow for distinctions to be made between “sloppy” plan administration versus deliberate action or fraud:

- Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;
- Duration of options backdating;
- Size of restatement due to options backdating;
- Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and
- Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.

**Compensation Committee Communications and Responsiveness**

Consider the following factors case-by-case when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay on the board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues:

- Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or
- Failure to adequately respond to the company’s previous say-on-pay proposal that received the support of less than 70 percent of votes cast, taking into account:
  - The company’s response, including:
    - Disclosure of engagement efforts with major institutional investors, including the frequency and timing of engagements and the company participants (including whether independent directors participated);
    - Disclosure of the specific concerns voiced by dissenting shareholders that led to the say-on-pay opposition;
    - Disclosure of specific and meaningful actions taken to address shareholders’ concerns;
- Other recent compensation actions taken by the company;
- Whether the issues raised are recurring or isolated;
- The company’s ownership structure; and
- Whether the support level was less than 50 percent, which would warrant the highest degree of responsiveness.

**Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans**

**General Recommendation:** Vote case-by-case on certain equity-based compensation plans depending on a combination of certain plan features and equity grant practices, where positive factors may counterbalance negative factors, and vice versa, as evaluated using an “equity plan scorecard” (EPSC) approach with three pillars:

- **Plan Cost:** The total estimated cost of the company’s equity plans relative to industry/market cap peers, measured by the company’s estimated Shareholder Value Transfer (SVT) in relation to peers and considering both:
  - SVT based on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants, plus outstanding unvested/unexercised grants; and
  - SVT based only on new shares requested plus shares remaining for future grants.

**Plan Features:**

- Discretionary or automatic single-triggered award vesting upon a change in control (CIC);
- Discretionary vesting authority;
- Liberal share recycling on various award types;
- Lack of minimum vesting period for grants made under the plan;
- Dividends payable prior to award vesting.

**Grant Practices:**

- The company’s three-year burn rate relative to its industry/market cap peers;
- Vesting requirements in most recent CEO equity grants (3-year look-back);
• The estimated duration of the plan (based on the sum of shares remaining available and the new shares requested, divided by the average annual shares granted in the prior three years);
• The proportion of the CEO’s most recent equity grants/awards subject to performance conditions;
• Whether the company maintains a claw-back policy;
• Whether the company has established post-exercise/vesting share-holding requirements.

Generally vote against the plan proposal if the combination of above factors indicates that the plan is not, overall, in shareholders’ interests, or if any of the following egregious factors apply:
• Awards may vest in connection with a liberal change-of-control definition;
• The plan would permit repricing or cash buyout of underwater options without shareholder approval (either by expressly permitting it — for NYSE and Nasdaq listed companies — or by not prohibiting it when the company has a history of repricing — for non-listed companies);
• The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices or a significant pay-for-performance disconnect under certain circumstances; or
• Any other plan features are determined to have a significant negative impact on shareholder interests.

SOCIAL/ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Global Approach

Issues covered under the policy include a wide range of topics, including consumer and product safety, environment and energy, labor standards and human rights, workplace and board diversity, and corporate political issues. While a variety of factors goes into each analysis, the overall principle guiding all vote recommendations focuses on how the proposal may enhance or protect shareholder value in either the short or long term.

General Recommendation: Generally vote case-by-case, taking into consideration whether implementation of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value, and in addition the following will also be considered:
• If the issues presented in the proposal are more appropriately or effectively dealt with through legislation or government regulation;
• If the company has already responded in an appropriate and sufficient manner to the issue(s) raised in the proposal;
• Whether the proposal’s request is unduly burdensome (scope or timeframe) or overly prescriptive;
• The company’s approach compared with any industry standard practices for addressing the issue(s) raised by the proposal;
• If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not reasonable and sufficient information is currently available to shareholders from the company or from other publicly available sources; and
• If the proposal requests increased disclosure or greater transparency, whether or not implementation would reveal proprietary or confidential information that could place the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Climate Change/Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions

General Recommendation: Generally vote for resolutions requesting that a company disclose information on the financial, physical, or regulatory risks it faces related to climate change on its operations and investments or on how the company identifies, measures, and manages such risks, considering:
• Whether the company already provides current, publicly-available information on the impact that climate change may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
• The company’s level of disclosure compared to industry peers; and
• Whether there are significant controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s climate change-related performance.

Generally vote for proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations, unless:
• The company already discloses current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
• The company’s level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and
• There are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company’s GHG emissions.

Vote case-by-case on proposals that call for the adoption of GHG reduction goals from products and operations, taking into account:
• Whether the company provides disclosure of year-over-year GHG emissions performance data;
• Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers;
• The company’s actual GHG emissions performance;
• The company’s current GHG emission policies, oversight mechanisms, and related initiatives; and
• Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions.

Board Diversity

**General Recommendation**: Generally vote for requests for reports on a company’s efforts to diversify the board, unless:
• The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and
• The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.

Vote case-by-case on proposals asking a company to increase the gender and racial minority representation on its board, taking into account:
• The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s board and among its executive officers;
• The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company’s industry peers;
• The company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation;
• Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language;
• The independence of the company’s nominating committee;
• Whether the company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and
• Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices.

Gender Pay Gap

**General Recommendation**: Generally vote case-by-case on requests for reports on a company’s pay data by gender, or a report on a company’s policies and goals to reduce any gender pay gap, taking into account:
• The company’s current policies and disclosure related to both its diversity and inclusion policies and practices and its compensation philosophy and fair and equitable compensation practices;
• Whether the company has been the subject of recent controversy, litigation, or regulatory actions related to gender pay gap issues; and
• Whether the company’s reporting regarding gender pay gap policies or initiatives is lagging its peers.

Data Security, Privacy, and Internet Issues

**General Recommendation**: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting the disclosure or implementation of data security, privacy, or information access and management policies and procedures, considering:
• The level of disclosure of company policies and procedures relating to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, information access and management, and Internet censorship;
• Engagement in dialogue with governments or relevant groups with respect to data security, privacy, or the free flow of information on the Internet;
• The scope of business involvement and of investment in countries whose governments censor or monitor the Internet and other telecommunications;
• Applicable market-specific laws or regulations that may be imposed on the company; and
• Controversies, fines, or litigation related to data security, privacy, freedom of speech, or Internet censorship.
Lobbying

**General Recommendation**: Vote case-by-case on proposals requesting information on a company’s lobbying (including direct, indirect, and grassroots lobbying) activities, policies, or procedures, considering:

- The company’s current disclosure of relevant lobbying policies, and management and board oversight;
- The company’s disclosure regarding trade associations or other groups that it supports, or is a member of, that engage in lobbying activities; and
- Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation regarding the company’s lobbying-related activities.

Political Contributions

**General Recommendation**: Generally vote for proposals requesting greater disclosure of a company’s political contributions and trade association spending policies and activities, considering:

- The company’s policies, and management and board oversight related to its direct political contributions and payments to trade associations or other groups that may be used for political purposes;
- The company’s disclosure regarding its support of, and participation in, trade associations or other groups that may make political contributions; and
- Recent significant controversies, fines, or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or political activities.

Vote against proposals barring a company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level; barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.

Vote against proposals to publish in newspapers and other media a company’s political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.

2. New nominees who served for only part of the fiscal year are generally exempted from the attendance policy.

3. Although all of a CEO's subsidiary boards will be counted as separate boards, ISS will not recommend a withhold vote for the CEO of a parent company board or any of the controlled (>50 percent ownership) subsidiaries of that parent, but may do so at subsidiaries that are less than 50 percent controlled and boards outside the parent/subsidiary relationships.

4. A “new nominee” is any current nominee who has not already been elected by shareholders and who joined the board after the problematic action in question transpired. If ISS cannot determine whether the nominee joined the board before or after the problematic action transpired, the nominee will be considered a “new nominee” if he or she joined the board within the 12 months prior to the upcoming shareholder meeting.

5. Public shareholders only, approval prior to a company’s becoming public is insufficient.

6. Examples of failure of risk oversight include, but are not limited to: bribery; large or serial fines or sanctions from regulatory bodies; significant adverse legal judgments or settlement; or hedging of company stock.

7. The Russell 3000E Index includes approximately 4,000 of the largest U.S. equity securities.

8. The revised peer group is generally comprised of 14-24 companies that are selected using market cap, revenue (or assets for certain financial firms), GICS industry group, and company’s selected peers’ GICS industry group, with size constraints, via a process designed to select peers that are comparable to the subject company in terms of revenue/assets and industry, and also within a market-cap bucket that is reflective of the company’s. For Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels companies, market cap is the only size determinant.

9. Only Russell 3000 Index companies are subject to the Absolute Alignment analysis.

10. ISS research reports include realizable pay for S&P1500 companies.

11. Proposals evaluated under the EPSC policy generally include those to approve or amend (1) stock option plans for employees and/or employees and directors, (2) restricted stock plans for employees and/or employees and directors, and (3) omnibus stock incentive plans for employees and/or employees and directors; amended plans will be further evaluated case-by-case.
Amundi Pioneer Asset Management

Proxy Voting

POLICY

Each of Amundi Pioneer Asset Management, Inc. and Amundi Pioneer Institutional Asset Management, Inc. (collectively, “Amundi Pioneer”) is a fiduciary that owes each of its clients the duties of care and loyalty with respect to all services undertaken on the client’s behalf, including voting proxies for securities held by the client. When Amundi Pioneer has been delegated proxy-voting authority for a client, the duty of care requires Amundi Pioneer to monitor corporate events and to vote the proxies. To satisfy its duty of loyalty, Amundi Pioneer must place the client’s interests ahead of its own and must cast proxy votes in a manner consistent with the best interest of the client. It is Amundi Pioneer’s policy to vote proxies presented to Amundi Pioneer in a timely manner in accordance with these principles.

Amundi Pioneer’s sole concern in voting proxies is the economic effect of the proposal on the value of portfolio holdings, considering both the short- and long-term impact. In many instances, Amundi Pioneer believes that supporting the company’s strategy and voting “for” management’s proposals builds portfolio value. In other cases, however, proposals set forth by management may have a negative effect on that value, while some shareholder proposals may hold the best prospects for enhancing it. Amundi Pioneer monitors developments in the proxy voting arena and will revise this policy as needed.

Amundi Pioneer’s clients may request copies of their proxy voting records and of Amundi Pioneer’s proxy voting policies and procedures by either sending a written request to Amundi Pioneer’s Proxy Coordinator, or clients may review Amundi Pioneer’s proxy voting policies and procedures on-line at AmundiPioneer.com. Amundi Pioneer may describe to clients its proxy voting policies and procedures by delivering a copy of Amundi Pioneer’s Form ADV (Part II), by separate notice to the client or by other means.

APPLICABILITY

This Proxy Voting policy and the procedures set forth below are designed to complement Amundi Pioneer’s investment policies and procedures regarding its general responsibility to monitor the performance and/or corporate events of companies that are issuers of securities held in accounts managed by Amundi Pioneer. This policy sets forth Amundi Pioneer’s position on a number of issues for which proxies may be solicited but it does not include all potential voting scenarios or proxy events. Furthermore, because of the special issues associated with proxy solicitations by closed-end Funds, Amundi Pioneer will vote shares of closed-end Funds on a case-by-case basis.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this policy is to ensure that proxies for United States (“US”) and non-US companies that are received in a timely manner will be voted in accordance with the principles stated above. Unless the Proxy Voting Oversight Group (as described below) specifically determines otherwise, all shares in a company held by Amundi Pioneer-managed accounts for which Amundi Pioneer has proxy-voting authority will be voted alike, unless a client has given specific voting instructions on an issue.

Amundi Pioneer does not delegate the authority to vote proxies relating to securities held by its clients to any of its affiliates. Any questions about this policy should be directed to Amundi Pioneer’s Director of Investment Operations (the “Proxy Coordinator”).

PROCEDURES

Proxy Voting Service

Amundi Pioneer has engaged an independent proxy voting service to assist in the voting of proxies. The proxy voting service works with custodians to ensure that all proxy materials are received by the custodians and are processed in a timely fashion.

To the extent applicable, the proxy voting service votes all proxies in accordance with the proxy voting guidelines established by Amundi Pioneer and set forth herein. The proxy voting service will refer proxy questions to the Proxy Coordinator (described below) for instructions under circumstances where: (1) the application of the proxy voting guidelines is unclear; (2) a particular proxy question is not covered by the guidelines; or (3) the guidelines call for specific instructions on a case-by-case basis. The proxy voting service is also requested to call to the Proxy Coordinator’s attention specific proxy questions that, while governed by a guideline, appear to involve unusual or controversial issues. Amundi Pioneer reserves the right to attend a meeting in person and may do so when it determines that the company or the matters to be voted on at the meeting are strategically important to its clients.
Proxy Coordinator

The Proxy Coordinator coordinates the voting, procedures and reporting of proxies on behalf of Amundi Pioneer’s clients. The Proxy Coordinator will deal directly with the proxy voting service and, in the case of proxy questions referred by the proxy voting service, will solicit voting recommendations and instructions from the Portfolio Management Group, or, to the extent applicable, investment sub-advisers. The Proxy Coordinator is responsible for ensuring that these questions and referrals are responded to in a timely fashion and for transmitting appropriate voting instructions to the proxy voting service. The Proxy Coordinator is responsible for verifying with the General Counsel or his or her designee whether Amundi Pioneer’s voting power is subject to any limitations or guidelines issued by the client (or in the case of an employee benefit plan, the plan’s trustee or other fiduciaries).

Referral Items

The proxy voting service will refer proxy questions to the Proxy Coordinator or his or her designee that are described by Amundi Pioneer’s proxy voting guidelines as to be voted on a case-by-case basis, that are not covered by Amundi Pioneer’s guidelines or where Amundi Pioneer’s guidelines may be unclear with respect to the matter to be voted on. Under such circumstances, the Proxy Coordinator will seek a written voting recommendation from the Chief Investment Officer, U.S or his or her designated equity portfolio-management representative. Any such recommendation will include: (i) the manner in which the proxies should be voted; (ii) the rationale underlying any such decision; and (iii) the disclosure of any contacts or communications made between Amundi Pioneer and any outside parties concerning the proxy proposal prior to the time that the voting instructions are provided.

Securities Lending

In accordance with industry standards proxies are not available to be voted when the shares are out on loan through either Amundi Pioneer’s lending program or a client’s managed security lending program. However, Amundi Pioneer will reserve the right to recall lent securities so that they may be voted according to Amundi Pioneer’s instructions. If a portfolio manager would like to vote a block of previously lent shares, the Proxy Coordinator will work with the portfolio manager and Investment Operations to recall the security, to the extent possible, to facilitate the vote on the entire block of shares. Certain clients participate in securities lending programs. Although such programs allow for the recall of securities for any reason, Amundi Pioneer may determine not to vote securities on loan and it may not always be possible for securities on loan to be recalled in time to be voted.

Share-Blocking

“Share-blocking” is a market practice whereby shares are sent to a custodian (which may be different than the account custodian) for record keeping and voting at the general meeting. The shares are unavailable for sale or delivery until the end of the blocking period (typically the day after general meeting date).

Amundi Pioneer will vote in those countries with “share-blocking.” In the event a manager would like to sell a security with “share-blocking”, the Proxy Coordinator will work with the Portfolio Manager and Investment Operations Department to recall the shares (as allowable within the market time-frame and practices) and/or communicate with executing brokerage firm. A list of countries with “share-blocking” is available from the Investment Operations Department upon request.

Proxy Voting Oversight Group

The members of the Proxy Voting Oversight Group include Amundi Pioneer’s Chief Investment Officer, U.S. or his or her designated equity portfolio management representative, the Director of Investment Operations, and the Chief Compliance Officer of the Adviser and Funds. Other members of Amundi Pioneer will be invited to attend meetings and otherwise participate as necessary. The Director of Investment Operations will chair the Proxy Voting Oversight Group.

The Proxy Voting Oversight Group is responsible for developing, evaluating, and changing (when necessary) Amundi Pioneer’s proxy voting policies and procedures. The Group meets at least annually to evaluate and review this policy and the services of its third-party proxy voting service. In addition, the Proxy Voting Oversight Group will meet as necessary to vote on referral items and address other business as necessary.

Amendments

Amundi Pioneer may not amend this policy without the prior approval of the Proxy Voting Oversight Group.
Filing Form NP-X

The Proxy Coordinator and the Director of Regulatory Reporting are responsible for ensuring that Form NP-X documents receive the proper review by a member of the Proxy Voting Oversight Group prior to a Fund officer signing the forms.

The Investment Operations department will provide the Compliance department with a copy of each Form N-PX filing prepared by the proxy voting service.

Compliance files N-PX.

The Compliance department will ensure that a corresponding Form N-PX exists for each Amundi Pioneer registered investment company.

Following this review, each Form N-PX is formatted for public dissemination via the EDGAR system. Prior to submission, each Form N-PX is to be presented to the Fund officer for a final review and signature.

Copies of the Form N-PX filings and their submission receipts are maintained according to Amundi Pioneer record keeping policies.

Proxy Voting Guidelines

Administrative

While administrative items appear infrequently in U.S. issuer proxies, they are quite common in non-U.S. proxies.

We will generally support these and similar management proposals:

- Corporate name change.
- A change of corporate headquarters.
- Stock exchange listing.
- Establishment of time and place of annual meeting.
- Adjournment or postponement of annual meeting.
- Acceptance/approval of financial statements.
- Approval of dividend payments, dividend reinvestment plans and other dividend-related proposals.
- Approval of minutes and other formalities.
- Authorization of the transferring of reserves and allocation of income.
- Amendments to authorized signatories.
- Approval of accounting method changes or change in fiscal year-end.
- Acceptance of labor agreements.
- Appointment of internal auditors.

Amundi Pioneer will vote on a case-by-case basis on other routine administrative items; however, Amundi Pioneer will oppose any routine proposal if insufficient information is presented in advance to allow Amundi Pioneer to judge the merit of the proposal. Amundi Pioneer has also instructed its proxy voting service to inform Amundi Pioneer of its analysis of any administrative items that may be inconsistent, in its view, with Amundi Pioneer’s goal of supporting the value of its clients’ portfolio holdings so that Amundi Pioneer may consider and vote on those items on a case-by-case basis.

Auditors

We normally vote for proposals to:

- Ratify the auditors. We will consider a vote against if we are concerned about the auditors’ independence or their past work for the company. Specifically, we will oppose the ratification of auditors and withhold votes for audit committee members if non-audit fees paid by the company to the auditing firm exceed the sum of audit fees plus audit-related fees plus permissible tax fees according to the disclosure categories proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
- Restore shareholder rights to ratify the auditors.
We will normally oppose proposals that require companies to:

- Seek bids from other auditors.
- Rotate auditing firms, except where the rotation is statutorily required or where rotation would demonstrably strengthen financial disclosure.
- Indemnify auditors.
- Prohibit auditors from engaging in non-audit services for the company.

**Board of Directors**

On issues related to the board of directors, Amundi Pioneer normally supports management. We will, however, consider a vote against management in instances where corporate performance has been very poor or where the board appears to lack independence.

**General Board Issues**

Amundi Pioneer will vote for:

- Audit, compensation and nominating committees composed of independent directors exclusively.
- Indemnification for directors for actions taken in good faith in accordance with the business judgment rule. We will vote against proposals for broader indemnification.
- Changes in board size that appear to have a legitimate business purpose and are not primarily for anti-takeover reasons.
- Election of an honorary director.

We will vote against:

- Minimum stock ownership by directors.
- Term limits for directors. Companies benefit from experienced directors, and shareholder control is better achieved through annual votes.
- Requirements for union or special interest representation on the board.
- Requirements to provide two candidates for each board seat.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on these issues:

- Separate chairman and CEO positions. We will consider voting with shareholders on these issues in cases of poor corporate performance.

**Elections of Directors**

In uncontested elections of directors we will vote against:

- Individual directors with absenteeism above 25% without valid reason. We support proposals that require disclosure of director attendance.
- Insider directors and affiliated outsiders who sit on the audit, compensation, stock option or nominating committees. For the purposes of our policy, we accept the definition of affiliated directors provided by our proxy voting service.

We will also vote against:

- Directors who have failed to act on a takeover offer where the majority of shareholders have tendered their shares.
- Directors who appear to lack independence or are associated with very poor corporate performance.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on these issues:

- Re-election of directors who have implemented or renewed a dead hand or modified dead-hand poison pill (a “dead-hand poison pill” is a shareholder rights plan that may be altered only by incumbent or “dead” directors. These plans prevent a potential acquirer from disabling a poison pill by obtaining control of the board through a proxy vote).
- Contested election of directors.
- Election of a greater number of independent directors (in order to move closer to a majority of independent directors) in cases of poor performance.
- Mandatory retirement policies.
- Directors who have ignored a shareholder proposal that has been approved by shareholders for two consecutive years.
We will vote for:

- Precatory and binding resolutions requesting that the board changes the company’s bylaws to stipulate that directors need to be elected with affirmative majority of votes cast, provided that the resolutions allow for plurality voting in cases of contested elections.

**Takeover-Related Measures**

Amundi Pioneer is generally opposed to proposals that may discourage takeover attempts. We believe that the potential for a takeover helps ensure that corporate performance remains high.

Amundi Pioneer will vote for:

- Cumulative voting.
- Increasing the ability for shareholders to call special meetings.
- Increasing the ability for shareholders to act by written consent.
- Restrictions on the ability to make greenmail payments.
- Submitting rights plans to shareholder vote.
- Rescinding shareholder rights plans (“poison pills”).
- Opting out of the following state takeover statutes:
  - Control share acquisition statutes, which deny large holders voting rights on holdings over a specified threshold.
  - Control share cash-out provisions, which require large holders to acquire shares from other holders.
  - Freeze-out provisions, which impose a waiting period on large holders before they can attempt to gain control.
  - Stakeholder laws, which permit directors to consider interests of non-shareholder constituencies.
  - Disgorgement provisions, which require acquirers to disgorge profits on purchases made before gaining control.
  - Fair price provisions.
  - Authorization of shareholder rights plans.
  - Labor protection provisions.
  - Mandatory classified boards.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on the following issues:

- Fair price provisions. We will vote against provisions requiring supermajority votes to approve takeovers. We will also consider voting against proposals that require a supermajority vote to repeal or amend the provision. Finally, we will consider the mechanism used to determine the fair price; we are generally opposed to complicated formulas or requirements to pay a premium.
- Opting out of state takeover statutes regarding fair price provisions. We will use the criteria used for fair price provisions in general to determine our vote on this issue.
- Proposals that allow shareholders to nominate directors.

We will vote against:

- Classified boards, except in the case of closed-end funds, where we shall vote on a case-by-case basis.
- Limiting shareholder ability to remove or appoint directors. We will support proposals to restore shareholder authority in this area. We will review on case-by-case basis proposals that authorize the board to make interim appointments.
- Classes of shares with unequal voting rights.
- Supermajority vote requirements.
- Severance packages (“golden” and “tin” parachutes). We will support proposals to put these packages to shareholder vote.
- Reimbursement of dissident proxy solicitation expenses. While we ordinarily support measures that encourage takeover bids, we believe that management should have full control over corporate funds.
- Extension of advance notice requirements for shareholder proposals.
- Granting board authority normally retained by shareholders (e.g., amend charter, set board size).
- Shareholder rights plans (“poison pills”). These plans generally allow shareholders to buy additional shares at a below-market price in the event of a change in control and may deter some bids.

**Capital Structure**

Managements need considerable flexibility in determining the company’s financial structure, and Amundi Pioneer normally supports managements’ proposals in this area. We will, however, reject proposals that impose high barriers to potential takeovers.
Amundi Pioneer will vote for:

- Changes in par value.
- Reverse splits, if accompanied by a reduction in number of shares.
- Shares repurchase programs, if all shareholders may participate on equal terms.
- Bond issuance.
- Increases in “ordinary” preferred stock.
- Proposals to have blank-check common stock placements (other than shares issued in the normal course of business) submitted for shareholder approval.
- Cancellation of company treasury shares.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on the following issues:

- Reverse splits not accompanied by a reduction in number of shares, considering the risk of delisting.
- Increase in authorized common stock. We will make a determination considering, among other factors:
  - Number of shares currently available for issuance;
  - Size of requested increase (we would normally approve increases of up to 100% of current authorization);
  - Proposed use of the proceeds from the issuance of additional shares; and
  - Potential consequences of a failure to increase the number of shares outstanding (e.g., delisting or bankruptcy).
- Blank-check preferred. We will normally oppose issuance of a new class of blank-check preferred, but may approve an increase in a class already outstanding if the company has demonstrated that it uses this flexibility appropriately.
- Proposals to submit private placements to shareholder vote.
- Other financing plans.

We will vote against preemptive rights that we believe limit a company’s financing flexibility.

**Compensation**

Amundi Pioneer supports compensation plans that link pay to shareholder returns and believes that management has the best understanding of the level of compensation needed to attract and retain qualified people. At the same time, stock-related compensation plans have a significant economic impact and a direct effect on the balance sheet. Therefore, while we do not want to micromanage a company’s compensation programs, we will place limits on the potential dilution these plans may impose.

Amundi Pioneer will vote for:

- 401(k) benefit plans.
- Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), as long as shares allocated to ESOPs are less than 5% of outstanding shares. Larger blocks of stock in ESOPs can serve as a takeover defense. We will support proposals to submit ESOPs to shareholder vote.
- Various issues related to the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), including:
  - Amendments to performance plans to conform with OBRA;
  - Caps on annual grants or amendments of administrative features;
  - Adding performance goals; and
  - Cash or cash-and-stock bonus plans.
- Establish a process to link pay, including stock-option grants, to performance, leaving specifics of implementation to the company.
- Require that option repricing be submitted to shareholders.
- Require the expensing of stock-option awards.
- Require reporting of executive retirement benefits (deferred compensation, split-dollar life insurance, SERPs, and pension benefits).
- Employee stock purchase plans where the purchase price is equal to at least 85% of the market price, where the offering period is no greater than 27 months and where potential dilution (as defined below) is no greater than 10%.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on the following issues:

- Shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information.
- Executive and director stock-related compensation plans. We will consider the following factors when reviewing these plans:
  - The program must be of a reasonable size. We will approve plans where the combined employee and director plans together would generate less than 15% dilution. We will reject plans with 15% or more potential dilution.
  - Dilution = \((A + B + C) / (A + B + C + D)\), where \(A\) = Shares reserved for plan/amendment,
  - \(B\) = Shares available under continuing plans,
  - \(C\) = Shares granted but unexercised and
  - \(D\) = Shares outstanding.

We will vote on the following issues:

- Shareholder proposals seeking additional disclosure of executive and director pay information.
- Executive and director stock-related compensation plans. We will consider the following factors when reviewing these plans:
  - The program must be of a reasonable size. We will approve plans where the combined employee and director plans together would generate less than 15% dilution. We will reject plans with 15% or more potential dilution.
  - Dilution = \((A + B + C) / (A + B + C + D)\), where \(A\) = Shares reserved for plan/amendment,
The plan must not:
- Explicitly permit unlimited option repricing authority or that have repriced in the past without shareholder approval.
- Be a self-replenishing “evergreen” plan or a plan that grants discount options and tax offset payments.
- We are generally in favor of proposals that increase participation beyond executives.
- We generally support proposals asking companies to adopt rigorous vesting provisions for stock option plans such as those that vest incrementally over, at least, a three- or four-year period with a pro rata portion of the shares becoming exercisable on an annual basis following grant date.
- We generally support proposals asking companies to disclose their window period policies for stock transactions. Window period policies ensure that employees do not exercise options based on insider information contemporaneous with quarterly earnings releases and other material corporate announcements.
- We generally support proposals asking companies to adopt stock holding periods for their executives.
- All other employee stock purchase plans.
- All other compensation-related proposals, including deferred compensation plans, employment agreements, loan guarantee programs and retirement plans.
- All other proposals regarding stock compensation plans, including extending the life of a plan, changing vesting restrictions, repricing options, lengthening exercise periods or accelerating distribution of awards and pyramiding and cashless exercise programs.

We will vote against:
- Pensions for non-employee directors. We believe these retirement plans reduce director objectivity.
- Elimination of stock option plans.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on these issues:
- Limits on executive and director pay.
- Stock in lieu of cash compensation for directors.

Corporate Governance

Amundi Pioneer will vote for:
- Confidential voting.
- Equal access provisions, which allow shareholders to contribute their opinions to proxy materials.
- Proposals requiring directors to disclose their ownership of shares in the company.

We will vote on a case-by-case basis on the following issues:
- Change in the state of incorporation. We will support reincorporations supported by valid business reasons. We will oppose those that appear to be solely for the purpose of strengthening takeover defenses.
- Bundled proposals. We will evaluate the overall impact of the proposal.
- Adopting or amending the charter, bylaws or articles of association.
- Shareholder appraisal rights, which allow shareholders to demand judicial review of an acquisition price.

We will vote against:
- Shareholder advisory committees. While management should solicit shareholder input, we prefer to leave the method of doing so to management’s discretion.
- Limitations on stock ownership or voting rights.
- Reduction in share ownership disclosure guidelines.

Mergers and Restructurings

Amundi Pioneer will vote on the following and similar issues on a case-by-case basis:
- Mergers and acquisitions.
- Corporate restructurings, including spin-offs, liquidations, asset sales, joint ventures, conversions to holding company and conversions to self-managed REIT structure.
- Debt restructurings.
- Conversion of securities.
- Issuance of shares to facilitate a merger.
- Private placements, warrants, convertible debentures.
• Proposals requiring management to inform shareholders of merger opportunities.

We will normally vote against shareholder proposals requiring that the company be put up for sale.

Mutual Funds

Many of our portfolios may invest in shares of closed-end funds or exchange-traded funds. The non-corporate structure of these investments raises several unique proxy voting issues.

Amundi Pioneer will vote for:

• Establishment of new classes or series of shares.
• Establishment of a master-feeder structure.

Amundi Pioneer will vote on a case-by-case basis:

• Changes in investment policy. We will normally support changes that do not affect the investment objective or overall risk level of the fund. We will examine more fundamental changes on a case-by-case basis.
• Approval of new or amended advisory contracts.
• Changes from closed-end to open-end format.
• Election of a greater number of independent directors (in order to move closer to a majority of independent directors) in cases of poor performance.
• Authorization for, or increase in, preferred shares.
• Disposition of assets, termination, liquidation, or mergers.
• Classified boards of closed-end funds, but will typically support such proposals.

Social Issues

Amundi Pioneer will abstain on stockholder proposals calling for greater disclosure of corporate activities with regard to social issues. “Social Issues” may generally be described as shareholder proposals for a company to:

• Conduct studies regarding certain issues of public concern and interest;
• Study the feasibility of the company taking certain actions with regard to such issues; or
• Take specific action, including ceasing certain behavior and adopting company standards and principles, in relation to issues of public concern and interest.

We believe these issues are important and should receive management attention.

Amundi Pioneer will vote against proposals calling for substantial changes in the company’s business or activities. We will also normally vote against proposals with regard to contributions, believing that management should control the routine disbursement of funds.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Amundi Pioneer recognizes that in certain circumstances a conflict of interest may arise when Amundi Pioneer votes a proxy.

A conflict of interest occurs when Amundi Pioneer’s interests interfere, or appear to interfere, with the interests of Amundi Pioneer’s clients.

A conflict may be actual or perceived and may exist, for example, when the matter to be voted on concerns:

• An affiliate of Amundi Pioneer, such as another company belonging to the Credit Agricole banking group (affiliate “Credit Agricole”);
• An issuer of a security for which Amundi Pioneer acts as a sponsor, advisor, manager, custodian, distributor, underwriter, broker, or other similar capacity (including those securities specifically declared by Amundi Asset Management to present a conflict of interest for Amundi Pioneer);
• An issuer of a security for which Amundi Asset Management has informed Amundi Pioneer that an Credit Agricole Affiliate acts as a sponsor, advisor, manager, custodian, distributor, underwriter, broker, or other similar capacity; or
• A person with whom Amundi Pioneer (or any of its affiliates) has an existing, material contract or business relationship.
Any member of the Proxy Voting Oversight Group and any other associate involved in the proxy voting process with knowledge of any apparent or actual conflict of interest must disclose such conflict to the Proxy Coordinator and the Chief Compliance Officer of Amundi Pioneer and the Funds. If any associate is lobbied or pressured with respect to any voting decision, whether within or outside of Amundi Pioneer, he or she should contact a member of the Proxy Voting Oversight Group or Amundi Pioneer’s Chief Compliance Officer.

The Proxy Voting Oversight Group will review each item referred to Amundi Pioneer by the proxy voting service to determine whether an actual or potential conflict of interest exists in connection with the proposal(s) to be voted upon. The review will be conducted by comparing the apparent parties affected by the proxy proposal being voted upon against the Controller’s and Compliance Department’s internal list of interested persons and, for any matches found, evaluating the anticipated magnitude and possible probability of any conflict of interest being present. The Proxy Voting Oversight Group may cause any of the following actions to be taken when a conflict of interest is present:

- Vote the proxy in accordance with the vote indicated under “Voting Guidelines,” if a vote is indicated, or
- [other]; or
- Direct the independent proxy voting service to vote the proxy in accordance with its independent assessment.

If the Proxy Voting Oversight Group perceives a material conflict of interest, the Group may also choose to disclose the conflict to the affected clients and solicit their consent to proceed with the vote, or may take such other action in good faith (in consultation with counsel) that would protect the interest of clients.

For each referral item, the determination regarding the presence or absence of any actual or potential conflict of interest will be documented in a Conflicts of Interest Report prepared by the Proxy Coordinator.

The Proxy Voting Oversight Group will review periodically the independence of the proxy voting service. This may include a review of the service’s conflict management procedures and other documentation and an evaluation as to whether the service continues to have the competency and capacity to vote proxies.

Decisions Not to Vote Proxies

Although it is Amundi Pioneer’s general policy to vote all proxies in accordance with the principles set forth in this policy, there may be situations in which the Proxy Voting Oversight Group does not vote a proxy referred to it. For example, because of the potential conflict of interest inherent in voting shares of a Credit Agricole Affiliate, Amundi Pioneer will abstain from voting the shares unless otherwise directed by a client. In such a case, the Proxy Coordinator will inform Amundi Asset Management Compliance before exercising voting rights.

There exist other situations in which the Proxy Voting Oversight Group may refrain from voting a proxy. For example, if the cost of voting a foreign security outweighs the benefit of voting, the Group may not vote the proxy. The Group may not be given enough time to process a vote, perhaps because its receives a meeting notice too late or it cannot obtain a translation of the agenda in the time available. If Amundi Pioneer has outstanding “sell” orders, the proxies for shares subject to the order may not be voted to facilitate the sale. Although Amundi Pioneer may hold shares on a company’s record date, if the shares are sold prior to the meeting date the Group may decide not to vote those shares.

SUPERVISION

ESCALATION

It is each associate’s responsibility to contact his or her business unit head, the Proxy Coordinator, a member of the Proxy Voting Oversight Group or Amundi Pioneer’s Chief Compliance Officer if he or she becomes aware of any possible noncompliance with this policy.

TRAINING

Amundi Pioneer will conduct periodic training regarding proxy voting and this policy. It is the responsibility of the business line policy owner and the applicable Compliance Department to coordinate and conduct such training.

RELATED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

RECORD KEEPING

The Proxy Coordinator shall ensure that Amundi Pioneer’s proxy voting service:

- Retains a copy of each proxy statement received (unless the proxy statement is available from the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system);
- Retains a record of the vote cast;
- Prepares Form N-PX for filing on behalf of each client that is a registered investment company; and
- Is able to promptly provide Amundi Pioneer with a copy of the voting record upon its request.

The Proxy Coordinator shall ensure that for those votes that may require additional documentation (i.e. conflicts of interest, exception votes and case-by-case votes) the following records are maintained:

- A record memorializing the basis for each referral vote cast;
- A copy of any document created by Amundi Pioneer that was material in making the decision on how to vote the subject proxy;
- A copy of any recommendation of the proxy voting service; and
- A copy of any conflict notice, conflict consent or any other written communication (including emails or other electronic communications) to or from the client (or in the case of an employee benefit plan, the plan’s trustee or other fiduciaries) regarding the subject proxy vote cast by, or the vote recommendation of, Amundi Pioneer.

Amundi Pioneer shall maintain the above records in the client’s file in accordance with applicable regulations.